

The Smart Contract Guard Model

Thaleia-Elpis Kavalierou

Department of Informatics and Computer Engineering
University of West Attica
Athens, Attica, Greece
cs171009@uniwa.gr

Ioanna Kantzavelou

Department of Informatics and Computer Engineering
University of West Attica
Athens, Attica, Greece
ikantz@uniwa.gr

ABSTRACT

Blockchain technology is extensively used where distributed and decentralized services are required. This paper proposes the Smart Contract Guard (SCG) model, with a blockchain approach that aims to shield the state of smart contracts from malicious actors and protect their storage.

KEYWORDS

Blockchain, Ethereum, smart contracts, guard, SCG model.

ACM Reference format:

Thaleia-Elpis Kavalierou and Ioanna Kantzavelou. 2021. The Smart Contract Guard Model. In Proceedings of ACM 3rd Summit on Gender Equality in Computing (GEC'21). ACM, New York, NY, USA, 1 page.

1 Introduction

A blockchain system allows transactions without any intervention of a trusted third party. Smart Contracts (SC) are programs that run when certain predefined conditions are met, and consist of transactions processed in distributed blockchains [1]. Among their discovered vulnerabilities, we identified some that target the storage of SC [2]. However, a vulnerable SC, already deployed in the Ethereum blockchain [1], cannot be modified in order to fix the vulnerability. The proposed Smart Contract Guard (SCG) model uses a sandbox, which runs the SC, regardless its vulnerabilities, using sandbox's storage. The main contribution of the proposed work is a method, incorporated in the SCG model, which preserves the real SC storage, by setting another SC in front of the real SC and combining a sandbox and the blockchain technology.

2 The Smart Contract Guard (SCG) Model

The *SCG model* employs a sandbox, a virtual environment for executable code testing used in computer security. Unlike other solutions, a sandbox does not control the code of the *Real SC*, but executes it, despite its vulnerabilities, in its own storage. Any "bad developments" will be detected during the execution time.

A *Sandbox SC* could protect the storage of the *Real*, which guards, by putting its own in the "front line". Following this pattern, the *Sandbox SC* storage will have the same structure as the *Real*. The

only difference is that it will not hold real data but it will be informed about the data current state by communicating with the *Real SC*.

The *SCG model*, presented in Figure 1, illustrates how it would protect a SC from a malicious actor. The *Guard* is the sandbox and the *Real SC* is the SC. They communicate by exchanging information regarding *Real's* data state (data, cryptocoin), the *Sandbox SC*, and the *Real's* method. An external user can take advantage only of *Real's* functionality, by passing through the *Sandbox SC*. The red arrow indicates that a potential *malicious actor* cannot directly contact to the *Real SC*.




Figure 1: The Smart Contract Guard model.

3 Conclusion

Every exploit could have been avoided by securing the access to SC's storage. The SCG model demonstrates how this condition can be resolved with the use of a Sandbox SC that seeks for security risks at runtime. Comparing to other approaches, with the most popular of them focusing on code auditing, this model aims to stand as a guard between the application's logic and the communication with its outside world. The model can be applied wherever an additional security level is required.

REFERENCES

- [1] Zibin Zheng, Shaoan Xie, Hong-Ning Dai, Weili Chen, Xiangping Chen, Jian Weng, and Muhammad Imran. An overview on smart contracts: Challenges, advances and platforms, Future Generation Computer Systems, Vol. 105, 2020, 475-491. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.future.2019.12.019>.
- [2] Stefano Bistarelli, Gianmarco Mazzante, Matteo Micheletti, Leonardo Mostarda, Davide Sestili, and Francesco Tiezzi. Ethereum smart contracts: Analysis and statistics of their source code and opcodes, Internet of Things, Vol. 11, 2020, 164-186, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.iot.2020.100198>.